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ABSTRACT
Fraud detection is essential in financial services, with the poten-
tial of greatly reducing criminal activities and saving considerable
resources for businesses and customers. We address online fraud
detection, which consists of classifying incoming transactions as
either legitimate or fraudulent in real-time. Modern fraud detection
systems consist of a machine learning model and rules defined by
human experts. Often, the rules performance degrades over time
due to concept drift, especially of adversarial nature. Furthermore,
they can be costly to maintain, either because they are computation-
ally expensive or because they send transactions for manual review.
We propose ARMS, an automated rules management system that
evaluates the contribution of individual rules and optimizes the
set of active rules using heuristic search and a user-defined loss-
function. It complies with critical domain-specific requirements,
such as handling different actions (e.g., accept, alert, and decline),
priorities, blacklists, and large datasets (i.e., hundreds of rules and
millions of transactions). We use ARMS to optimize the rule-based
systems of two real-world clients. Results show that it can maintain
the original systems’ performance (e.g., recall, or false-positive rate)
using only a fraction of the original rules (≈ 50% in one case, and
≈ 20% in the other).
CCS CONCEPTS
• Theory of computation→ Optimization with randomized
search heuristics; • Software and its engineering→ Genetic
programming; • Applied computing→ Online banking; Online
shopping; Secure online transactions;
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1 INTRODUCTION
Financial institutions, merchants, customers, and government agen-
cies alike suffer fraud-related losses daily, including credit card
theft and other scams. Financial fraud consists of someone inappro-
priately obtaining the details of a payment card (e.g., a credit/debit
card) and using it to make unauthorized transactions. Frequently,
the cardholder detects such illicit usage and initiates a dispute with
the bank to be reimbursed (a chargeback), at the expense of the mer-
chant or bank that accepted the transaction. An over-conservative
decision-maker might block all suspicious activity. However, this is
far from optimal, as fraud patterns are not trivial, and it prevents
legitimate economic activity. Therefore, it is essential to adjust
automated fraud detection systems to the risk profile of the client.
Modern automated fraud detection systems consist of a machine
learning (ML) model followed by a rule-based system. The model
scores the transaction. The rule-based system uses the score and
triggers of manually defined rules to decide an action (i.e., accept,
alert, or decline the transaction). Rule-based systems with many
rules are complex, hard tomaintain, and frequently computationally
expensive. An ideal system has only a minimum set of rules that
ensure performance while preserving requirements and alerts low.
Our main contributions are the following:
(1) Identifying a new problem: how to properly evaluate a complex
rules system (taking into account overlapping rule triggers
with different rule priorities and blacklists)? (Section 2).
(2) Proposing ARMS (Figure 1), a framework which handles all
bookkeeping necessary to correctly evaluate such rules sys-
tems (Sections 3.1–3.4).
(3) Exploring optimizationmethods (namely random search, greedy
expansion, and genetic programming) to improve the original
system according to user-defined criteria (Sections 3.5-3.8).
(4) Evaluating our proposed solutions on both synthetic and real
data, demonstrating improvements to existing rules systems
deployed at Feedzai (Section 4).
Evaluating the performance of the whole fraud detection system
is simple: given the fraud labels (i.e., the chargebacks) and the
historical decisions, we compute performance metrics (e.g., recall
at a given false positive rate or FPR). However, it is not enough to
analyze the performance of each rule by itself. We need to consider
how it contributes to the entire system as its triggers may overlap
with other rules with different decisions and priorities. Blacklists are
another source of dependencies. Blacklisting rules, when triggered
due to fraudulent behavior, blacklist the user (or email, or card) so
that their future transactions are promptly declined. Deactivating
blacklisting rules has side effects on the blacklists themselves and,
therefore, in triggering or not rules that verify them.
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Figure 1: ARMS components: handling blacklists, priority shuffling, and optimizing a user-defined loss function.
In this work, we study the use case of a systemwith a pre-existing
set of rules and priorities to optimize according to a user-defined
objective function. As far as we know, we are the first to address the
proper evaluation and optimization of such complex rules systems.
A suitable goal is to minimize the number of rules and alerts while
keeping the original system’s performance (e.g., recall). We explore
three different methods (random, greedy, and genetic algorithms),
using synthetic data and data sets from real-world online merchants.
Our results show that ARMS can significantly reduce the number
of rules while maintaining the system’s performance. We stress
that rules can depend on expensive aggregations (e.g., the average
amount of the user’s transactions in the last month). Thus, ARMS
brings meaningful gains in practical fraud detection settings.
We organize the remainder of the paper as follows. Section 2
gives an overview of fraud detection systems and discusses related
work. Section 3 presents ARMS main components: handling black-
lists, rules system evaluation, priority shuffling, and rules system
optimization. Section 4 presents our results in synthetic data and
real-world clients. Finally, we discuss our conclusions in Section 5.
2 BACKGROUND
2.1 Fraud detection
We focus on fraud detection in online payments, where a fraud-
ster makes unauthorized transactions online. Fraud detection can
be formulated as a binary classification task: each transaction is
represented as a feature vector, z, and labeled as either fraudulent
(positive class, y = 1) or legitimate (negative class, y = 0). Other
approaches frame it as an outlier detection problem [9] that treats
fraudulent transactions as anomalies. Typical outlier detection is
unsupervised, and often results in much lower performance.
We consider fraud detection as a two-step process. First, when a
transaction occurs, a feature engineering step, д(z), is applied to the
raw features z, resulting in processed features, x. An example of a
processed feature (a profile) is the number of transactions for a card
in the last hour. Secondly, the automated fraud detection system
evaluates the transactions and decides between three actions: to
accept the transaction, to decline it, or to alert it to be manually re-
viewed (so that specialized fraud analysts investigate it and produce
a final decision). Reviews are complicated (i.e., subject to human
error) and expensive, as they require specialized knowledge and
introduce unnecessary friction for legitimate transactions.
2.2 Automated fraud detection system
We consider an automated fraud detection system consisting of a
machine learning model followed by a rule-based system.
2.2.1 Machine learning model. The supervised machine learn-
ing model trains offline using historical data. When evaluating a
transaction, the model then produces a score, yˆ ∈ [0, 1], that is
typically the probability of fraud given the features, P (y = 1 | x).
2.2.2 Rule-based system. Rules consist of conditions and corre-
sponding actions. Depending on the action, the rules can be accept,
alert, or decline rules. Rules may depend on the model score (e.g., if
yˆ < 0.5 then accept the transaction), and the features (e.g., if the
transaction is above a risky amount, then alert/decline it). Since a
transaction might trigger multiple rules with contradictory actions,
priorities are necessary. Finally, rules can be switched on and off
at any time. The rules system encapsulates all rules, their state (ac-
tive or not), and priorities. Generally, the rule system is a function,
f (x, yˆ), that evaluates a list of rules and returns an action.
2.3 System evaluation
To assess system performance, we compare the system’s decisions
with the labels coming from chargebacks or the fraud analysts’
decisions. Then, we compute the relevant performance metrics.
2.4 Rule evaluation
The rules system, f (x, yˆ), receives the processed features and the
model score and returns a decision to accept, alert, or decline. It
comprises a set of rules, R = (R1,R2, . . . ,Rk ), applied individually
on incoming transactions. Hence, transactions may trigger none,
one, some, or all of these rules.
We aim to measure the contribution of individual rules to the
system. Typically, at the time of the deployment of the system (i.e.,
after training with the latest data), rules and priorities perform well.
However, as time goes by, fraud patterns change, and performance
degrades. This degradation is acute in fraud detection, given the ad-
versarial context (fraudsters often change their strategies). Whereas
some rules remain beneficial, others may become redundant or even
degrade the performance of the system. Figure 2 illustrates how an
initially good rule can degrade over time. As rule-based systems
remain in production for a long time, it is essential to monitor
how individual rules are impacting the system, namely their fraud
detection and computational performances (rules can be heavy to
compute, e.g., if they depend on profiles).
One naive approach is to evaluate each rule independently by
measuring how well its decisions match the labels (intuitively, ac-
cept rules should find legitimate transactions, while alert and de-
cline rules should find fraudulent transactions). Then, if the rule’s
performance is inadequate, it is discarded. Notwithstanding, this
2
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Alert rule Accept rule Decline rule
Time
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
fraudulent
legitimate
Alert rule
Figure 2: Rule degradation: (a) transactions in the feature
space, (b-d) an alert, an accept, and a decline rule are progres-
sively added, and trigger for some transactions. The alert
rule has a good ratio of correct alerts when added, but by
the end it is alerting only legitimate transactions (e).
approach is problematic and insufficient because it disregards in-
teractions between rules. Consider the following examples:
• Low-priority rules can perform outstandingly when no high-
priority rules are triggered (e.g., in specific corner cases), but
perform very poorly if used individually.
• Turning off high-priority rules allows lower-priorities rules to
act; this can lead to different decisions by the system.
Instead of this naive approach, we build a rules management
system that takes into account the interactions between rules with
different actions and different priorities when evaluating them.
2.5 State-of-the-art
We review current work on the optimization of rule-based systems
using search heuristics. Table 1 shows an overview of the methods.
Ishibuchi et al. propose a method to maximize correctly classi-
fied instances, while reducing the number of rules, using genetic
programming [7]. This approach is not sufficiently flexible for the
fraud detection use-case, as the client (e.g., a merchant or bank) may
want to optimize for other metrics (e.g., recall, or a combination of
metrics). Moreover, their method neglects priorities, and it is not
clear if it scales up well for fraud detection data sets with millions
of transactions (they used the Iris data set [5], which consists of 150
records). In a later study, they compare multiple heuristics, namely
greedy search and genetic programming, in four small data sets [8].
Some approaches target specific use-cases, namely financial trad-
ing [1] or opinion mining [10]. Besides the domain, another crucial
difference between our research and the work by Allen et al. is that,
instead of learning new rules, we optimize existing rule systems.
Rosset et al. describe a method that learns and selects rules for
telecommunication fraud detection [11]. Like us, the authors stress
the importance of choosing a good set of rules, instead of a set
of good rules. However, we target online transaction fraud and
optimize a more complex system with priorities and blacklists.
Table 1: Comparison of rules management systems.
[8] [1] [10] [11] [3] [6] ARMS
various rule actions ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓
rule priorities ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ * ✗ ✓
> million instances ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓
user-defined loss ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓
blacklists ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓
rule learning ✗ ✓ ✗ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗
* optimizes rule weights instead
Table 2: Notation.
Features X = (X1,X2, ...,Xm )
Rules R = (R1,R2, ...,Rk )
Priority space P = {p ∈ Z | p ≥ −1}
Rule priority pi ∈ P
Rule active condition pi > −1
Rules priority vector p = (p1,p2, ...,pk )
Priority-action map a : pi → {accept ,alert ,decline}
Transaction feature vector x = (x1,x2, ...,xm )
Transactions X = (x1, x2, ..., xn)
Transaction rules vector r = ({p1,−1}, {p2,−1}, ..., {pk ,−1})
Rules triggers matrix R = [rx1 , rx2 , ..., rxn ]T
Labels vector ℓ = [ℓx1 , ℓx2 , ..., ℓxn ]T
Blacklist updater rules Bu ⊂ R
Blacklist checker rules Bc ⊂ R
Loss function λ
Performance Ω (contains Ωloss , Ωr ecall , etc.)
Duman et al. propose a system combining genetic programming
and scatter search to optimize ruleweights and other parameters [3].
Similar to our case, the rules are based on expert knowledge and
suffer from concept drift. Each rule has a weight corresponding to
its contribution to a fraud score, unlike our work, which considers
priorities to activate a single rule. Furthermore, Duman et al. do
not consider blacklists, different rule actions (e.g., accept, alert, and
decline), and uses a predefined fitness function that minimizes the
money loss. Additionally, the most substantial data set considered
contains only ≈ 250 thousand transactions and 43 rules and pa-
rameters. They report money savings of 212% at the cost of a 67%
increase in false positives, and, after manual tuning, they settled for
a system with savings of 189% and a 35% increase in false positives.
Gianini et al. optimize a system of 51 rules using a game theory
approach [6]. They measure rule importance using Shapley val-
ues [13] as a measure of contribution to the system. They propose
two strategies: (1) select the n rules with highest Shapley values
(and deactivate the others) and (2) greedy expansion of the set of
rules using the Shapley values of the rules. Both strategies per-
formed identically and were able to reduce the number of rules
down to 30 while maintaining the original system’s F-score. Like
Duman et al. [3], this approach disregards essential constraints of
the fraud detection system we are considering: rule priorities, rule
actions, blacklists, and support for a user-defined loss function.
3 ARMS
We start this section with an overview of ARMS. Then, we describe
in detail each of its main components: handling blacklisting rules,
the evaluation of the rule-based system, rule priority shuffle, and,
finally, the optimization strategies to select rules.
3.1 System overview
Algorithm 1 gives a general view of ARMS. We refer the reader to
Table 2 for the notation used throughout this work.
ARMS receives the following information as inputs:
• Features. A vector of features, X (e.g., username, email).
• Transactions. A matrix Xn×m containing the values of them
features for each of the n transactions. It is needed to compute
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blacklists (i.e., to know blacklisted values for each feature, e.g.,
username = fraudster91).
• Triggers or activations. A matrix Rn×k containing the rule
triggers of the k rules for each of the n transactions. Each
cell Ri j = −1 if rule Rj did not trigger for transaction xi or
Ri j = pj (i.e., the rule’s priority) if it did.
• Labels. A vector with the label for each transaction, ℓ.
• Priorities. A vector with the priority of each rule, p.
• Actions. A map, a, mapping rule priorities to actions (i.e.,
accept, alert, or decline).
• Blacklisting rules. A set of blacklisting rules containing rules
that update the blacklist, Bu , and rules that check it, Bc .
• Method. Optimization strategy, µ (i.e., random search, greedy
expansion, or genetic programming).
• Loss function. A loss function, λ, defined by the user.
• Priority shuffle. A boolean,arp, specifyingwhether to augment
the rules pool R by cloning rules with different priorities.
• Optimization parameters. Set of parameters, θ , which are
specific to the optimization strategy (e.g., population size or
mutation probability for the genetic algorithm or the number
of evaluations for the random search).
ARMS starts by addressing the blacklist dependencies (line 1 of
Algorithm 1; details in Section 3.2). Then, ARMS evaluates the orig-
inal system’s performance, Ω1 (line 2 of Algorithm 1; Section 3.3).
This evaluation runs before optimization because the loss function
often depends on the original performance (e.g., optimize the FPR,
while maintaining recall). Afterwards, ARMS augments the rules
pool, if the user so desires (lines 3-4 of Algorithm 1; Section 3.4).
This adds new rules with the same triggers as existing rules, but
with different priorities. The rationale is that changing priorities
might improve the system. Finally, ARMS optimizes the rules sys-
tem (line 5 of Algorithm 1; Section 3.5). In essence, ARMS turns off
rules and changes their priorities, obtaining a new priority vector,
pbest, to reduce the loss of the system, Ωbest .
Algorithm 1 ARMS: Automated Rules Management System.
Input: Vector X, Matrix X, Matrix R, vector ℓ, vector p, map a, set
B, loss function λ, method µ, parameter arp ∈ {0, 1}, parameters θ
Output: Vector pbest, performance Ωbest
1: BD← computeBlacklistDependencies(R, X, X, B)
2: Ω1 ← evaluate(X, R, ℓ, p, a, B, BD, λ)
3: if arp = 1 then
4: R← augmentRulesPool(R, p, a)
5: (pbest,Ωbest ) ← µ.optimize(X, R, ℓ, p, a, BD, λ, Ω1, θ )
3.2 Handling blacklists
Both analysts and rules can blacklist entities. If an analyst finds
transaction x to be fraudulent, they can blacklist some of its entities
(e.g., in the future, always decline transactions from the email used
in transaction x). Similarly, blacklist updater rules add entities to
the blacklist when they trigger. Other rules, called blacklist checker
rules, trigger when a transaction contains a blacklisted entity.
Therefore, blacklist rules have side effects. Deactivating blacklist
updater rules can lead to blacklist checker rules not triggering,
and affect the system’s performance. Thus, we need to take this
into account when evaluating the system. For this purpose, ARMS
keeps a state of the blacklists and manages them according to the
interaction between blacklist updater and blacklist checker rules
(for a detailed description, we refer to Supplementary Algorithm S1).
3.3 Rules system evaluation
ARMS evaluates (Algorithm 2) the original system and the con-
figurations produced by the optimization strategies (Section 3.5).
It creates an empty confusion matrix, V (line 2), to be updated
by traversing each transaction, x ∈ X, alongside its rule triggers,
ri ∈ R, and its label, ℓi ∈ ℓ (lines 3-9). For each transaction:
(1) ARMS computes the activations r′i (i.e., what rules are active
and with what priority), using priority vector p (line 4). When
ARMS is evaluating the original system, p contains the original
rules’ priorities; however, rule priority shuffling and optimiza-
tion strategies generate variations of p.
(2) ARMS checks whether to turn off any blacklist checker rules
as a side-effect and stores that in r′′i (line 5).
(3) ARMS obtains the final decision, oi , from r′′i , i.e., to accept,
alert, or decline (line 6). It is the action of the highest priority
rule triggered for the transaction that is active.
(4) ARMS evaluates the decision, oi , against the label ℓi , storing
it in vi (line 7). Accepting a legitimate transaction is a true
negative. Declining/alerting a legitimate transaction is a false
positive. Declining/alerting a fraudulent transaction is a true
positive. Accepting a fraudulent transaction is a false negative.
The confusion matrix, V, is updated with vi (line 8).
Finally, ARMS uses the confusion matrix V to compute the rule
configuration’s performance, Ω, based on a user-defined loss func-
tion, λ (line 9). The loss function allows optimizing (e.g., minimize
the number of active rules, maximize recall) and satisfying metrics
or constraints (e.g., keep the original system’s FPR). We discuss loss
functions used in synthetic data and real-world clients in Section 4.
Algorithm 2 Rules system evaluation.
1: function evaluate(X, R, ℓ, p, a, B, BD, λ)
2: V← initConfusionMatrix()
3: for all x ∈ X, ri ∈ R, ℓi ∈ ℓ do
4: r′i ← mask(ri, p)
5: r′′i ← handleBD(r′i , B, BD[x])
6: oi ← a(max(r′′i ))
7: vi ← getTruthValue(oi , ℓi )
8: V← updateConfusionMatrix(V, vi )
9: Ω ← λ(V)
10: return Ω
3.4 Priority shuffle
Initial rule priorities require expert knowledge and are defined
by clients or fraud analysts. Over time, however, the system re-
quires adjusted priorities to deal with concept drift and incorporate
emerging knowledge (e.g., new rules). In this sectionwe discuss how
ARMS addresses priority shuffling for optimization (Section 3.5).
First, we discuss how ARMS changes the priority of individual rules.
Then, we discuss how ARMS can augment the initial rules pool by
cloning existing rules and assigning them alternative priorities.
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3.4.1 Random priority shuffle. Since the system might have
many rules and many possible priorities, the search space of all
possible rule priorities can be gigantic. A more efficient alternative
for such cases is to use random priority shuffle. For a given rule ri
with priority pi , ARMS changes its priority to pj , pi with the same
action, i.e., ai = aj . The new rule priority is sampled considering
uniform probabilities. Consider the illustrative example with three
types of accept rules: weak accept with priority 1, strong accept with
priority 3, and whitelist accept with priority 5. Random priority
shuffle can, for example, change the priority of a strong accept to
either 1 (weak accept) or 5 (whitelist accept).
3.4.2 Augment rules pool. Another option is to augment the
initial pool by cloning existing rules (i.e., same triggers), but assign-
ing them different priorities. Starting from the existing priorities,
p, we create variants for each pi ∈ p, with all possible alternative
priorities with the same action, E. Then, for eachpj ∈ E, ARMS adds
a new vector (a new "rule") with the same triggers as the original
rule and the new priority, pj , to the rules triggers matrix, R.
3.5 Optimization strategies
ARMS uses two fundamental mechanisms to optimize a rule-based
system: deactivate underperforming rules and change priorities. It
is unfeasible to test all possible combinations. Instead, we employ
three heuristics (methods): random search (Section 3.6), greedy
expansion (Section 3.7), and genetic programming (Section 3.8).
First, we give an overview of ARMS optimization (Algorithm 3),
as methods share a similar structure. The original system (i.e., with
rule priorities p and performance Ω1) is the one to beat (line 1). Until
meeting a predefined stopping criteria (line 3), ARMS generates
new priority vectors, p′, which are variations of the original p (line
4). The criteria can be to stop after k hours, after computing n
variations, or when the loss between consecutive iterations does
not improve above a threshold ϵ . ARMS saves the variation with
lowest loss it finds, pbest, alongside its performance Ωbest , and
returns them to the user (lines 5-8). The fundamental difference
between methods is how they generate the variations, p′.
Algorithm 3 ARMS optimization.
θ : parameters of the method
1: function µ.optimize(X, R, ℓ, p, a, BD, λ, Ω1, θ )
2: (pbest,Ωbest ) ← (p,Ω1)
3: while stoppingCriteriaNotMet() do
4: generate a new p′ from p
5: if p′ is the best so far then
6: save it as pbest
7: save its performance as Ωbest
8: return (pbest,Ωbest )
3.6 Random search
A straightforward approach is to generate random rules priority
vectors, p′, and evaluate them against the original p, saving the best
rule configuration p′ that it found.While this approach seems naive,
it is a natural baseline that can be better and less expensive than
grid or manual searches [2]. Random search has two parameters:
• Rule shutoff probability, ρ. Percentage of rules to deactivate,
e.g., if ρ = 50%, then ARMS turns off ≈ 50% of the rules.
• Rule priority shuffle probability, γ . Percentage of rules with
priorities changed, e.g., if γ = 50%, then ARMS generates new
priority vectors for ≈ 50% of the rules.
For more detail, we refer to Supplementary Algorithm S2.
3.7 Greedy expansion
ARMS contains a greedy expansion module, that starts from a
set of inactive rules and greedily turns on rules, one at the time.
Greedy solutions are not guaranteed to find the global optimum.
Consider the following example, where we want to optimize recall
and rules R1, R2, and R3 have recall 70%, 69%, and 20%, respectively.
A greedy solution would pick R1 first. Now, imagine that rules
R2 and R3 are detrimental to R1, i.e., the system becomes worse
if we combine R1 with either R2 or R3. Hence, the final solution
is a system with only R1. Imagine, however, that R2 and R3 are
somewhat complementary, and that, when combined, the system’s
recall is > 70%. Then, the global optimum is > 70%, and the greedy
solution is not optimal. Nevertheless, greedy heuristics can find
useful solutions in a reasonable time.
For more detail, we refer to Supplementary Algorithm S3.
3.8 Genetic programming
Genetic programming is standard in classification tasks [4], such as
fraud detection. It continuously improves a population of solutions
by combining them using crossovers and random mutations, while
keeping a fraction of the best solutions for the next iteration.
In our case, we build a population of random rule configurations
and improve them with genetic programming. The algorithm has
three parameters:
• Population size,ψ . Number of configurations per iteration, e.g.,
ifψ = 100, ARMS evaluates 100 different rule configurations
per iteration.
• Survivors fraction, α . Fraction of the top configurations that
survive for the next iteration, e.g., if ψ = 100 and α = 20%,
only the 20 best solutions survive for the next iteration. If α is
high, then we might achieve higher variability but get stuck
trying to improve bad solutions. If α is low, then the lack of
variability might prevent the system from reaching a good
solution.
• Mutation probability, ρ. The percentage of rules subject to
random mutation, e.g., if ρ = 20%, then 20% of the rules are
randomly mutated (i.e., the child rule configuration mutates
the parents rules configuration). If ρ is high, we leave little
room for genetic optimization and are essentially doing a ran-
dom search. If ρ is low, we are more dependent on finding
good parent configurations.
For more detail, we refer to Supplementary Algorithm S4.
4 EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
We test the following hypotheses: (h1) ARMS turns off rules and,
at least, maintains system performance, (h2) ARMS changes the
priority of rules and improves system performance, (h3) results are
stable (i.e., similar across folds).
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4.1 Synthetic data
Since we can not find public data sets similar to our own, we use
synthetic data to test hypotheses (h1–h2). Later, we also test (h1–
h3) in real datasets. We generate 225k labels with a fraud rate of 5%
(i.e., 11250 positive labels) and simulate accept, alert, and decline
rules from the labels. The support of a rule corresponds to how
many times it triggers. An accept rule with negative predictive
value (NPV) of k% is correct k% of the times that it triggers (i.e.,
out of all triggers, k% will be true negatives). The same goes for the
precision (PPV) of an alert or decline rule (i.e., out of all triggers, k%
will be true positives). We sample the support, NPV and precision
from Gaussian distributions and use 10 different priority levels (for
details see Supplementary Section A.1) and divide the data set into
three splits: train, validation, and test, with 75k "transactions" each.
4.2 Methodology
We run ARMS on the train set and do parameter tuning in the
validation set. We detail the parameter space in Supplementary
Section A.2. We ensure that results are comparable between random
search and genetic programming by keeping the number of rule
configuration evaluations fixed (i.e., n = 300k).
We optimize the loss function from Equation 1 with α = 0.1,
β = 0.5, andγ = 0.4. Note thatΩ1 andΩ′ are the performance of the
original system and of a configuration found by ARMS, respectively;
Ωrules% is the percentage of active rules, Ωr ecall% is the recall, and
Ωaler t% is the alert rate.
λ(R′) = α ∗ Ω′rules% − β ∗ Ω
′
r ecall + γ ∗ Ω
′
aler ts% (1)
Finally, we evaluate the four final methods in the test set: the
original system, and the best rule system configuration found by
random search, greedy expansion, and genetic programming.
4.3 Results on synthetic data
After running parameter tuning (note that the greedy expansion
method does not have any parameter), we find that the following
parameters were the best:
• Random search: ρ = 40%.
• Genetic programming: ρ = 10%,ψ = 30, α = 5%.
For brevity, we omit results for other parameters; we do a more
thorough analysis of the parameters in real data sets (Section 4.6).
We observe that all methods improved upon the original system,
and that genetic programming was the one with highest perfor-
mance (Table 3). When we ran augmented rules pool (ARP) before
optimization, results consistently improved. Thus, we verify hy-
pothesis (h1) and (h2).
Table 3: Performance of ARMS in synthetic data.
recall alerts % rules off loss
original 13.11% 0.779% none 0.0376
random 79.53% 1.013% 38 (38.8%) -0.1837
greedy 54.42% 1.746% 34 (34.7%) -0.1998
genetic 52.82% 1.067% 45 (45.9%) -0.2058
greedy w/ arp 53.30% 1.107% 43 (43.9%) -0.2060
genetic w/ arp 53.09% 0.97% 45 (45.9%) -0.2075
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Figure 3: Datasets fraud rate evolution (concept drift).
4.4 Real-world data sets
We evaluate ARMS on representative samples of real-world data
sets of two online merchants. In both cases, an automated fraud
detection system actively scores transactions in production. We
collected the rule triggers, model decisions, and blacklists. The data
sets comprise dozens of rules, with different actions (i.e., accept,
alert, and decline) and multiple priorities (more details in Supple-
mentary Section A.3). For privacy compliance, we refer to the data
sets simply as D1 and D2.
The data covers six months of transactions. We divide each data
set in four sequential and overlapping folds of three months each
(for temporal cross-validation, detailed in Section 4.5.3) and split
each fold into three sequential sets (train, validation, and test) of
one month each.
Unless explicitly stated, when wemention fraud, we are referring
to validated fraud (i.e., chargebacks or fraud confirmed by analysts,
not transactions declined by the automated fraud detection system).
Due to the adversarial setting and other factors, we observe concept
drift in both data sets. Figure 3 shows the evolution of the fraud
rate in D1 and D2 (with May 2018 as reference), highlighting the
system’s ability to reduce fraud over time.
While both clients are online merchants, they have three impor-
tant differences:
(1) D1 has more non-verified declined transactions. It has ≈ 14x
more auto-declined transactions than confirmed frauds, due
to the specific requirements of the client. Using automati-
cally declined transactions for training is dangerous as it
creates a feedback loop. Thus, we disregard them in train-
ing and validation but use them in testing so that results
are comparable to a production setting. Moreover, for this
dataset, ARMS does not optimize decline rules.
(2) Only D2 uses blacklists.
(3) The active rules in D2 changed multiple times during the
period under study, while the rules in D1 never changed.
4.5 Methodology
4.5.1 Optimization metrics (loss functions). Online merchants
are required to keep the fraud-to-gross rate (FTG) under a certain
threshold, or else they face fines. Thus, a sensible approach is to
minimize the FPR and ensure that recall is within the legal re-
quirements. The system should be able to pick up all the necessary
fraud (ideally, all of it) without declining legitimate transactions.
Additionally, reducing the number of rules and alerts decreases the
overall cost of the system. We use different loss functions for each
data set, showing ARMS’ ability to fit diverse use-cases:
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• In D1, the FPR is artificially high due to the many trans-
actions declined by the automated fraud detection system.
Therefore, our focus is to remove rules, Ω′rules%, and reduce
alerts, Ω′aler t%, while maintaining approximately the same
recall, Ω′r ecall , as the original rule-based system, Ω
1
r ecall ,
(Equation 2). We use α = β = 12 , thus giving equal impor-
tance to both objectives.
• In D2, the objective is to remove rules, Ω′rules%, but also to
improve recall, Ω′r ecall , while maintaining approximately
the same FPR, Ω′f pr , as the original system, Ω
1
f pr , (Equa-
tion 3). We use α = 0.05 and β = 0.95, thus attributing more
importance to improving recall than to reducing the number
of rules.
λ(R′) =
{
α ∗ Ω′rules% + β ∗ Ω
′
aler t% if Ω
′
r ecall ≥ 0.95 ∗ Ω1r ecall
α + β + (Ω1r ecall − Ω
′
r ecall ) otherwise
(2)
λ(R′) =
{
α ∗ Ω′rules% − β ∗ Ω
′
r ecall if Ω
′
f pr ≤ Ω1f pr
α + (Ω1f pr − Ω
′
f pr ) otherwise
(3)
4.5.2 Baselines. We compare ARMS optimized rule systems
against three baselines:
(1) Original system (All on): system with all rules and origi-
nal priorities.
(2) Mandatory system (All off ): system with no rules except
for the ones that cannot be deactivated due to business rea-
sons, with the original priorities.
(3) Random search: generate r independent rule configura-
tions, using different values of ρ (Section 3.6).
If ARMS finds rule systems better than baselines 1 and 2 by
turning off rules, we successfully address (h1). If it further improves
its performance by also tuning rule priorities, we address (h2).
4.5.3 Temporal cross validation (TCV). We use TCV to verify
(h3). For each data set, we create four folds composed of three sets
(i.e., train, validation, and test) of one month each. We train ARMS
with different search heuristics and parameters on each train data
set, evaluate the resulting configurations on the validation data set,
and identify the best one for each heuristic. Finally, we evaluate
the winners and the baselines on the test set.
4.5.4 Optimization strategies. We run ARMS with two differ-
ent optimization strategies: greedy expansion (Section 3.7) and
genetic programming (Section 3.8). Results for both are shown in
Sections 4.6.2 and 4.6.3, respectively.
4.6 Results on real data
Unless stated otherwise, the results refer to rule configurations
obtained in the train data of each fold and evaluated in the respective
validation set. Results shown are always relative to the original
system baseline and show the gains relative to the current system
in production, i.e., ∆loss is the difference between the loss of the
system being evaluated and the original one.
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Figure 5: Greedy expansion against baselines in D1.
4.6.1 Baselines comparison. We compare the original system
(all on) against the mandatory system (all off ) and against random
search, with n = 10000 and ρ as a tunable parameter with values
spaced out in 4% intervals (Figure 4 for D1). We observe that the
mandatory system has a higher loss than the other systems, as it
fails to meet the recall constraint from Equation 2. We also observe
that random search is almost always superior to the original system,
regardless of ρ. In a few cases, the random search is worse than
the original system because it does not meet the recall constraint,
namely with aggressive configurations (e.g., ρ = 88%). On the other
hand, aggressive random search (higher ρ) can decrease the loss
significantly, so there is a trade-off between being able to meet
the recall constraints and lowering the loss. We observe similar
behavior for D2, and thus omit results for brevity. Nevertheless, we
show metrics besides the loss for D2 in Supplementary Figure S1.
From these results, we decide to use random search with ρ = 46%
forD1, and ρ = 58% forD2, for the baselines, alongside the original
system and the mandatory system for both data sets.
4.6.2 Greedy expansion results. We test greedy expansion with
and without ARP. We find that ARP did not improve the system
in D1 or D2. One possible explanation is that greedy expansion
yields simple systems with few rules, so it did not benefit from
ARP. Another possibility is that the original priorities are already
well-tuned for both data sets as they correspond to mature systems.
When compared against the baselines, the outcomes vary. For
D1, the greedy expansion was superior to the baselines except for
the second fold, where it failed to met the constraints (Figure 5). In
the other three folds, greedy expansion was able to remove ≈ 75% of
the rules and reduce alerts. For D2, however, the greedy expansion
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Figure 6: Greedy expansion rule order consistency in D1.
was worse than the baselines in two of the four folds, as it did not
respect the constraints (Supplementary Figure S2).
We also evaluate the consistency between rules across folds.
Recall that the greedy expansion obtains an ordered list of rules
sequentially by importance. We compare the ordered lists across
folds and compute their normalized discounted cumulative gain
(NDCG) in Figure 6.We show results of the first fold of D1 compared
with the other folds. We observe that rules are consistent across
folds (NDCG values are consistently > 0.7), but the NDCG line
drops (e.g., important rules in fold A are more similar to important
rules in fold B than in fold C). We observe similar behavior in D2
(omitted for brevity).
4.6.3 Genetic programming results. We evaluate how the genetic
programming method (Section 3.8) improves fraud detection. Since
our datasets are very big, we can not perform a grid search on all
parameters. Thus, we have a three phase process.
First, we find a good set of default parameters. For this purpose,
we setψ = 100 and do grid search on α and ρ. We do n = 10000 eval-
uations by default, i.e., forψ = 100, then r = 100 runs. We perform
a grid search on α ∈ [2%, 5%, 10%, 20%] and ρ ∈ [0%, 2%, 5%, 10%].
For D1, we find that ρ = 10% outperforms the baselines across
datasplits and that random search takes longer to achieve similar
losses (e.g., for fold A; Supplementary Figure S3). The overall best
parameters were found to be ρ = 10%, α = 5%, and ρ = 5%.
Secondly, we study how each parameter influences the loss. For
this purpose, we vary only one parameter at a time and keep the
others at the default values. Since parameters r ,ψ , ρ, α are ordinal,
we try 10 different values for each and see how increasing each
parameter individually influences the loss. Figure 7 shows results
for fold A of D1. We observe that, in general, increasing ρ and α
makes the performance worse; however the best α is 10%, thus,
keeping some of the best individual configurations is important.
We also observe that r influences the loss much more thanψ (e.g.,
both (r = 100,ψ = 10) and (r = 10,ψ = 100) perform 1000 rule
evaluations, but the first one leads to lower losses). Typically, the
loss improves as you increase r and ψ , but it plateaus relatively
quickly for both (i.e., r at 300,ψ at 400). Similar conclusions hold
for D2 (omitted for space concerns). We did not observe gains in
changing rule priorities during genetic optimization.
Finally, we measure ARMS performance on the test sets. We
compare ARMS using genetic programming against the baselines
and ARMS using greedy search. To do this, we evaluate the rules
deactivations suggested by ARMS (trained on the train sets and
evaluated in the validation sets) on the respective test sets of each
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Figure 7: Genetic: influence of r ,ψ , ρ, α on fold A of D1.
fold. ForD1, we evaluate the best rule configuration found by ARMS
using r = 1000,ψ = 250, α = 5%, ρ = 5%, and no priority shuffling.
For D2, we evaluate the best rule configuration found by ARMS
using r = 1000,ψ = 150, α = 20%, ρ = 5%, and no priority shuffling.
For D1, we observe that greedy and genetic optimization per-
formed similarly and better than random search with ρ = 46%
(Figure 8). For D2, we observe that random search and the genetic
programming approaches perform similarly; the greedy method
fails to comply to the constraints in two of the four folds (Figure 9).
In order to check the consistency of ARMS across data folds,
we measure the Jaccard similarity [12] of the deactivated rules
suggested by ARMS in different splits. We see that the Jaccard is
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Figure 8: Performance of ARMS on the test sets of D1.
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Figure 9: Performance of ARMS on the test sets of D2.
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Table 4: ARMS consistency results (i.e., across folds). We highlight in bold the lowest loss for each fold.
A B C D
A 1 0.930 0.902 0.826
B – 1 0.950 0.820
C – – 1 0.829
D – – – 1
(a) Jaccard of removed rules (D1).
A B C D
A 1 0.789 0.696 0.636
B – 1 0.773 0.565
C – – 1 0.708
D – – – 1
(b) Jaccard of removed rules (D2).
A B C D
A 0.275 0.344 0.274 0.273
B – 0.348 0.277 0.275
C – – 0.268 0.267
D – – – 0.264
(c) Loss on future folds (D1).
A B C D
A -0.626 -0.613 -0.651 -0.662
B – -0.612 -0.651 -0.662
C – – -0.678 -0.696
D – – – -0.704
(d) Loss on future folds (D2).
higher for D1 than D2 (Table 4 (a)-(b)). The fact that D2 rule set
changes across folds obviously leads to intrinsically lower values
(i.e., regardless of what ARMS deactivates). We also evaluate sys-
tems trained on a given fold in more recent folds (e.g., we train
ARMS on fold A and evaluate it the test set of A, B, C and D). We
observe that systems trained on older folds have good performance
on more recent test sets (Table 4 (c)-(d)).
4.6.4 Summary. We evaluated ARMS on two big online mer-
chants. For D1, ARMS using genetic programming (or greedy ex-
pansion) was able to remove ≈ 50% of the original 193 rules, while
maintaining the original system performance (i.e., keeping 95% of
the original recall). Thus, ARMS was able to improve the original
system (h1). We also saw that results are stable across data-splits
(h3). We did not see gains of using priority shuffling (h2). For D2,
we observed that ARMS was able to remove ≈ 80% of the system
rules while maintaining the original system performance (i.e., keep-
ing a low FPR). Thus, ARMS improved the original system (h1).
Similar to D1, we found evidence supporting (h3) but not (h2).
4.6.5 Discussion. Real-world transaction data sets for fraud de-
tection pose several challenges. Auto-declines lead to unreliable
labels, and thus we cannot verify if a system positive is a true pos-
itive, meaning that decline rules cannot be evaluated unless an
analyst verifies auto-declines. In practice this is difficult because
fraud analysts’ time is a very limited resource. The two systems
that we chose are also particularly hard to optimize since they
have been in production for years and have been manually tuned
by data scientists. Finally, we evaluated ARMS’ performance on
past transactions and did not measure its performance in produc-
tion. We think that putting ARMS in production and continuously
optimizing the rules system could lead to better results.
5 CONCLUSION
We have proposed ARMS, a framework that optimizes rules systems
using search heuristics, namely random search, greedy expansion,
and genetic programming. To the best of our knowledge, ARMS
is the first to (1) handle different rule priorities and actions, (2)
address blacklists side effects, and (3) optimize user-defined func-
tions. These components are essential in real-world fraud detection
systems. Our results in real-world clients demonstrate that ARMS
is capable of maintaining the original system’s performance while
greatly reducing the number of rules (between 50% and 80%, in our
experiments) and minimizing other metrics (e.g., alert rate).
Currently we are adding a rules suggestions module to ARMS,
which is beyond the scope of this paper. In the future we also plan
to incorporate a module to simultaneously tune the rules and the
machine learning model threshold.
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A SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS
A.1 Synthetic data
The set of rules comprises 8 accept rules, 30 review rules, and 60
decline rules. The support of the accept rules was sampled from a
Gaussian distributionN(45000, 225002), while the support of the re-
view and decline rules was sampled fromN(22.5, 225.02). The NPV
of accept rules was sampled fromN(0.75, 0.202), while the precision
of the alert and decline rules was sampled from N(0.17, 0.052).
Rules have ten possible priorities. Accept rules have priority
pa ∈ {0, 1, 5, 6, 10}, alert rules have priority pl ∈ {2, 4, 7, 9}, and
decline rules have priority pd ∈ {3, 8}.
A.2 Synthetic data parameter tuning
A.2.1 Random search. We use 16 mutation probabilities, i.e.,
ρ ∈ [4%, 94%], in intervals of 4%, i.e., ρ = 4%, ρ = 8%, ...
A.2.2 Genetic programming. We use three mutation probabili-
ties, i.e., ρ = 10%, ρ = 20%, and ρ = 30%. We use two population
sizes, i.e.,ψ = 20 andψ = 30. Finally, we use two survivors fractions,
i.e., α = 2% and α = 5%.
A.3 Real-world datasets
A.3.1 D1. The client has 198 rules, with one of three possible
actions: accept, alert, and decline. Out of the 198 rules, 30 of them are
accept rules, 89 are alert rules, and 79 are decline rules. Accept rules
have four different priority levels pa ∈ {1, 8, 10, 15}, alert rules have
two pa ∈ {5, 11}, and decline rules have three pd ∈ {6, 9, 12}. If no
rules are triggered, the default action is to accept the transaction.
The dataset contains few validated fraud, i.e., of the declined (by
the model/rules) and fraudulent population of transactions, only a
small portion was validated by analysts or via chargeback.
We note that decline rules and auto-declined transactions are
ignored in the train and validation datasets. We make this choice
because decline rules can not be validated. However, when we
measure performance in the test set, decline rules are included in
order to make results directly comparable to the results obtained
in production.
We do temporal cross validation (TCV) with four folds and each
set has one month of data.
A.3.2 D2. UnlikeD1, which has the same activated rules for the
whole period, in D2 the rules changed. During the seven months
period a total of 13 rules were added, while some were removed,
increasing the number of rules in the set from the original 77 to 90.
Rules have one of three outcomes: accept, alert, and alert&decline
(this means that most auto-declined are verified, unlike inD1). From
those, 6 are accept rules, 48 are alert rules, and 36 are alert&decline
rules. Accept rules have priority pa ∈ {0, 5, 10}, alert rules have
priority pl = 1, and alert&decline rules have priority pd ∈ {2, 4, 8}.
Three of the decline rules are blacklist checker rules, and all 36
alert&decline rules are blacklist updater rules.
Since D2 has a high ratio of validated fraud, all rules are opti-
mized by ARMS, however the auto-decline transactions are not
used during the training process, but are present in the test set in
order to make results directly comparable to the results obtained
in production.
We do temporal cross validation (TCV) with four folds and each
set has one month of data.
A.4 Supplementary Algorithms and Figures
Algorithm S1 Blacklist propagation.
1: function computeBlacklistDependencies(R, X, X, B)
2: BL← {}
3: BD← {}
4: for all x ∈ X do
5: for all Rj ∈ Bu do
6: if r j , −1 then
7: for all Xl ∈ X that Rj blacklists do
8: BL[(Rj , Xl : xl )].append([x.t ime, +∞])
9: for all Rq ∈ Bc that checks Xl do
10: BD[x].add(Rj ≺ Rq )
11: if r j = −1 then
12: for all Xl ∈ X that Rj can blacklist do
13: if x.t ime is in any BL[(Rj , Xl : xl )] then
14: r j ← pj
15: for all {xl ∈ x | xl is in any active blacklist } do
16: if (∄Rq ∈ Bc | pq , −1) then
17: for all {Rj ∈ Bu | (Rj , Xl : xl ) ∈ BL} do
18: BL[(Rj , Xl : xl )].last()← [_, x.t ime]
19: for all Rq ∈ Bc do
20: if rq , −1 and | {(Ri ≺ Rq ) ∈ BD[x] | Ri ∈ Bu } | = 0 then
21: BD[x].add(Rq ≺ Rq ))
22: return BD
Algorithm S2 Random search optimization.
θ : { rule shutoff probability ρ , rule priority shuffle probability γ }
1: function Random.optimize(X, R, ℓ, p, a, BD, λ, Ω1 , θ )
2: pbest ← p
3: Ωbest ← Ω1
4: while stoppingCriteriaNotMet() do
5: prand ← p
6: for all pi ∈ prand do
7: with γ% probability, do:
8: pi ← randomPriorityShuffle(pi , a)
9: with ρ% probability, do:
10: pi ← −1
11: Ωrand ← evaluate(X, R, ℓ, prand , a, B, BD, λ)
12: if Ωrandloss < Ω
best
loss then
13: Ωbest ← Ωrand
14: pbest ← prand
15: return (pbest, Ωbest )
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Algorithm S3 Greedy expansion optimization.
θ : { backtracking bt ∈ {true, f alse } }
1: function Greedy.optimize(X, R, ℓ, p, a, BD, λ, Ω1 , θ )
2: pbest ← p
3: Ωbest ← Ω1
4: pkeep ← (−1, ..., −1)
5: pgreedy ← (−1, ..., −1)
6: Q ← ∅
7: while |Q | < |R | and stoppingCriteriaNotMet() do
8: Rkeep ← None
9: Ωkeep ← +∞
10: for all {Rj ∈ R | Rj < Q } do
11: pдr eedyj ← pj
12: Ωдr eedy ← evaluate(X, R, ℓ, pgreedy , a, B, BD, λ)
13: if Ωдr eedyloss < Ω
keep
loss then
14: Rkeep ← Rj
15: Ωkeep ← Ωдr eedy
16: pkeep ← pgreedy
17: pдr eedyj ← −1
18: Q .add(Rkeep )
19: if Ωkeeploss < Ω
best
loss then
20: Ωbest ← Ωkeep
21: pbest ← pkeep
22: if bt is true and isBacktrackingTime() then
23: run greedy contraction to remove l rules, l < |Q |
24: return (pbest, Ωbest )
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Figure S1: Baseline metrics comparison in D2.
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Figure S2: Greedy expansion results in D2.
Algorithm S4 Genetic programming optimization.
θ : { Population sizeψ , survivors fraction α , mutation probability ρ }
1: function Genetic.optimize(X, R, ℓ, p, a, BD, λ, Ω1 , θ )
2: pbest ← p
3: Ωbest ← Ω1
4: P← generateInitialPopulation(R, p,ψ , ρ )
5: while stoppingCriteriaNotMet() do
6: (P=, P−) ← evaluatePopulation(P, α )
7: P+ ← mutateAndCrossover(P= , α ,ψ , ρ )
8: P← {P=, P+ }
9: (P=, P−) ← evaluatePopulation(P)
10: pbest ← P=1
11: Ωbest ← evaluate(X, R, ℓ, pbest , a, B, BD, λ)
12: return (pbest, Ωbest )
13: function generateInitialPopulation(R, p,ψ , ρ )
14: P← ∅
15: for i ∈ [0, ψ [ do
16: p′ ← p
17: for all p′j ∈ p′ do
18: with ρ% probability, do:
19: p′j ← −1
20: P[i] ← p′
21: return P
22: function mutateAndCrossover(P= , α ,ψ , ρ )
23: P+ ← ∅
24: for i ∈ [0, (1 − α ) ∗ψ [ do
25: pmother ← getRandomVector(P=)
26: pfather ← getRandomVector(P=)
27: pchild ← pmother
28: for all pchildj ∈ pchild do
29: with 50% probability, do:
30: pchildj ← p f atherj
31: for all pchildj ∈ pchild do
32: with ρ% probability, do:
33: pchildj ← randomPriorityShuffle(pi , a)
34: P+ .add(pchild)
35: return P+
Figure S3: Genetic programming loss versus random search
by number of evaluations in foldA ofD1 (zoomed in the first
10000 rule evaluations; themethods nearly converge eventu-
ally)
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